1) Certain actions reveal things about the actor that cause us to have lower trust in them.
2) Certain actions alter the psychology of the actor to make them less trustworthy.
These things can be independent of the actual effect of the action. For instance, let us say that somebody gets a realistic doll of a woman, then engages in sado-masochistic sexual acts with them and ritualistic torture murder. The doll is even less alive than your theoretical brain dead body, but the effect is fairly similar. You would never trust such a person, regardless of whether their action caused "harm" (it likely harms their psyche).
To be totally honest, if I didn't think abortion had such strong connotations for #1 and #2 I wouldn't be as offended by it. I would probably put it in the same category as birth control. But it clearly effects #1 and #2 in a way birth control does not.
P.S. Your brain dead scenario plays out in "Kill Bill". The protagonists violently murders the assailants.
1. Ah, I think I should have been clearer. In my mind, I was thinking more to the effect of "gratuitous" in the sense of something like extent of proportionality in jus in bello and jus ad bellum. What I meant is not the gratuitousness of the action but the gratuitousness of the harm caused by said action to reach a just goal in (Ps. I love falafel sandwiches). If it is true that fending off unwanted use of one's body is a just goal, and the action which is necessary to reach the just goal is a D&E abortion for a mother carrying an unwanted pregnancy, then this seems disanalagous to the torture case where the action of torturing dead bodies is not necessary to any conceivable just goal.
2. Cool! Thanks for the book recommendation. It's been a great read thus far, and I'm inclined to agree with this. My point, however, is best addressed by 3.
3. I'm not sure I understand your argument. For humans are usually persons and animals non-persons, torturing non-person humans is worse than non-person animals? I think it's maybe missing a premise; this argument wouldn't be valid in formal logic (I.e. the premises don't entail the conclusion.)
4. Interesting, although I must admit you are the only pro-life interlocutor who makes distinct personhood at 24 weeks (which is later than my personhood point, although I rarely use personhood arguments anymore).
5. I'm unsure how under your argument, chemical abortions are morally wrong at all. Even if my assessment is false, then the sheer violence of the torture case is clearly nothing like a medication abortion. What reason could then be given to consider such chemical abortions morally wrong?
1. If a braindead body contained 25 cents of coins in its intestines, I think most people would think it was morally wrong to mutilate the body just to get the 25 cents of coins, even if the mutilation was strictly necessary for the goal of obtaining those 25 cents. So the goal is not good enough to justify the means.
2. We are accustomed to all humans being persons, so torturing something that is human or looks like a human is more depraved than torturing something that is an animal or looks like an animal.
5. There's an argument that destroying an embryo is like mild desecration of a corpse. Bad, but not as bad as mutilating braindead living bodies.
The torture emporium isn’t bad. It just reveals that some people are sadists, which itself doesn’t make them evil but still I don’t want them to hold any power. It’s like pedophilia: it’s unfortunate your brain is that way but still I don’t want you around kids, even if you super pinky swear promise not to act out your evil impulses.
Abortion has a benefit outside of the immediate pleasure of the sadist. Much like how I view meat eaters as less than totally evil because while they do in fact derive pleasure from the suffering of others, the suffering isn’t the point.
I think the hint you concede in your 'exceptions' section undermines the entire point of the analogy. In my view, what makes the torture of brain dead persons wrong is that it is gratuitous. But if indeed, you have conceded that the fetus isn't a person i.e. has no inherent value, whereas the woman has some interest in fending off an unwanted use of her resources (which even pro-lifers admit is at least somewhat reasonable and therefore at least somewhat inherently valuable), then the fact that achievement of said goal in some cases medically necessitates D&E makes it disanalogous from the torture case.
I do not see how your attack against "Shout Your Abortion" pages stands. These pages celebrate abortion, sure (I find that disturbing). But the morally relevant thing is the gratuitousness. Insofar as abortions are themselves not gratuitous inherently, whether some women celebrate it after it is done or not isn't morally relevant.
Also, I think you beg the question by this analogy or prove too much. One could say the same seemingly moral repulsion would arise if torture were committed on say, dead cows. However, it would therefore follow that killing cows in factory farms for beef is morally wrong even if the vegan position on their moral status is false, which isn't an absurdity, but something I doubt you hold. Alternatively, you could say that the said repulsion is felt by you for humans, but this sui generis moral status for humans is not felt by the pro-choice activists that deny fetal personhood; this is precisely the contention that you purport to concede.
Moreover, most people do not see that torturing a braindead person is morally equivalent to doing so to a fully conscious adult. Should it be then understood that if your analogy were true, abortion is a lesser evil than murder (contra the usual pro-life position). To what extent is it a lesser moral evil than the homicide of an adult human.
Lastly, this shows that some forms of abortion are immoral. However, are you really committed to the view that a medication abortion or a hysterectomy that isn't as barbaric seeming, is fine but D&E isn't?
1. If "gratuitous" means anything that's not absolutely necessary, then the vast majority of people are going to disagree with your assessment that the gratuitousness is the thing that makes the torture emporium bad. When I buy a delicious falafel sandwich for lunch, that's gratuitous - I could have packed something less tasty. But most people think there's a moral difference between gratuitously eating a falafel sandwich and gratuitously torturing braindead bodies.
2. I DO hold that a lot of what's done in slaughterhouses would be morally wrong even if the animals magically stopped being conscious the moment they stepped into the slaughterhouse. This book by Jonathan Foer https://www.amazon.com/Eating-Animals-Jonathan-Safran-Foer/dp/0316069884 talks about how slaughterhouse workers get totally desensitized and become sadistic. People should not have to work in those conditions.
3. Torturing animals bodies is a lot less bad than torturing human bodies. Even when the human body is not a person (e.g. braindead humans) because humans are usually persons and animals are almost never persons.
4. Yes I am committed to the view that abortion before 24 weeks is morally less bad than murder, and my position is actually the usual pro-life position. There are fewer people who want to ban all abortions than people who support moderate restrictions, the total-ban people are just louder.
5. Yes, I am committed to the view that an early term chemical abortion is less bad than a gruesome mid-term D&E abortion.
You might want to put some kind of warning before the picture of the crushed baby head. Wasn't ready for that!
You're right. I updated the post and added a warning.
1) Certain actions reveal things about the actor that cause us to have lower trust in them.
2) Certain actions alter the psychology of the actor to make them less trustworthy.
These things can be independent of the actual effect of the action. For instance, let us say that somebody gets a realistic doll of a woman, then engages in sado-masochistic sexual acts with them and ritualistic torture murder. The doll is even less alive than your theoretical brain dead body, but the effect is fairly similar. You would never trust such a person, regardless of whether their action caused "harm" (it likely harms their psyche).
To be totally honest, if I didn't think abortion had such strong connotations for #1 and #2 I wouldn't be as offended by it. I would probably put it in the same category as birth control. But it clearly effects #1 and #2 in a way birth control does not.
P.S. Your brain dead scenario plays out in "Kill Bill". The protagonists violently murders the assailants.
1. Ah, I think I should have been clearer. In my mind, I was thinking more to the effect of "gratuitous" in the sense of something like extent of proportionality in jus in bello and jus ad bellum. What I meant is not the gratuitousness of the action but the gratuitousness of the harm caused by said action to reach a just goal in (Ps. I love falafel sandwiches). If it is true that fending off unwanted use of one's body is a just goal, and the action which is necessary to reach the just goal is a D&E abortion for a mother carrying an unwanted pregnancy, then this seems disanalagous to the torture case where the action of torturing dead bodies is not necessary to any conceivable just goal.
2. Cool! Thanks for the book recommendation. It's been a great read thus far, and I'm inclined to agree with this. My point, however, is best addressed by 3.
3. I'm not sure I understand your argument. For humans are usually persons and animals non-persons, torturing non-person humans is worse than non-person animals? I think it's maybe missing a premise; this argument wouldn't be valid in formal logic (I.e. the premises don't entail the conclusion.)
4. Interesting, although I must admit you are the only pro-life interlocutor who makes distinct personhood at 24 weeks (which is later than my personhood point, although I rarely use personhood arguments anymore).
5. I'm unsure how under your argument, chemical abortions are morally wrong at all. Even if my assessment is false, then the sheer violence of the torture case is clearly nothing like a medication abortion. What reason could then be given to consider such chemical abortions morally wrong?
1. If a braindead body contained 25 cents of coins in its intestines, I think most people would think it was morally wrong to mutilate the body just to get the 25 cents of coins, even if the mutilation was strictly necessary for the goal of obtaining those 25 cents. So the goal is not good enough to justify the means.
2. We are accustomed to all humans being persons, so torturing something that is human or looks like a human is more depraved than torturing something that is an animal or looks like an animal.
5. There's an argument that destroying an embryo is like mild desecration of a corpse. Bad, but not as bad as mutilating braindead living bodies.
The torture emporium isn’t bad. It just reveals that some people are sadists, which itself doesn’t make them evil but still I don’t want them to hold any power. It’s like pedophilia: it’s unfortunate your brain is that way but still I don’t want you around kids, even if you super pinky swear promise not to act out your evil impulses.
Abortion has a benefit outside of the immediate pleasure of the sadist. Much like how I view meat eaters as less than totally evil because while they do in fact derive pleasure from the suffering of others, the suffering isn’t the point.
I think that sadism is bad. I don't believe that there are people who are incurably wired that way. Same for pedophilia.
That seems unlikely but as far as I know, nobody knows for sure.
Thank you for this. Horrifying, but worth broaching.
I think the hint you concede in your 'exceptions' section undermines the entire point of the analogy. In my view, what makes the torture of brain dead persons wrong is that it is gratuitous. But if indeed, you have conceded that the fetus isn't a person i.e. has no inherent value, whereas the woman has some interest in fending off an unwanted use of her resources (which even pro-lifers admit is at least somewhat reasonable and therefore at least somewhat inherently valuable), then the fact that achievement of said goal in some cases medically necessitates D&E makes it disanalogous from the torture case.
I do not see how your attack against "Shout Your Abortion" pages stands. These pages celebrate abortion, sure (I find that disturbing). But the morally relevant thing is the gratuitousness. Insofar as abortions are themselves not gratuitous inherently, whether some women celebrate it after it is done or not isn't morally relevant.
Also, I think you beg the question by this analogy or prove too much. One could say the same seemingly moral repulsion would arise if torture were committed on say, dead cows. However, it would therefore follow that killing cows in factory farms for beef is morally wrong even if the vegan position on their moral status is false, which isn't an absurdity, but something I doubt you hold. Alternatively, you could say that the said repulsion is felt by you for humans, but this sui generis moral status for humans is not felt by the pro-choice activists that deny fetal personhood; this is precisely the contention that you purport to concede.
Moreover, most people do not see that torturing a braindead person is morally equivalent to doing so to a fully conscious adult. Should it be then understood that if your analogy were true, abortion is a lesser evil than murder (contra the usual pro-life position). To what extent is it a lesser moral evil than the homicide of an adult human.
Lastly, this shows that some forms of abortion are immoral. However, are you really committed to the view that a medication abortion or a hysterectomy that isn't as barbaric seeming, is fine but D&E isn't?
Thanks for your thoughtful response.
1. If "gratuitous" means anything that's not absolutely necessary, then the vast majority of people are going to disagree with your assessment that the gratuitousness is the thing that makes the torture emporium bad. When I buy a delicious falafel sandwich for lunch, that's gratuitous - I could have packed something less tasty. But most people think there's a moral difference between gratuitously eating a falafel sandwich and gratuitously torturing braindead bodies.
2. I DO hold that a lot of what's done in slaughterhouses would be morally wrong even if the animals magically stopped being conscious the moment they stepped into the slaughterhouse. This book by Jonathan Foer https://www.amazon.com/Eating-Animals-Jonathan-Safran-Foer/dp/0316069884 talks about how slaughterhouse workers get totally desensitized and become sadistic. People should not have to work in those conditions.
3. Torturing animals bodies is a lot less bad than torturing human bodies. Even when the human body is not a person (e.g. braindead humans) because humans are usually persons and animals are almost never persons.
4. Yes I am committed to the view that abortion before 24 weeks is morally less bad than murder, and my position is actually the usual pro-life position. There are fewer people who want to ban all abortions than people who support moderate restrictions, the total-ban people are just louder.
5. Yes, I am committed to the view that an early term chemical abortion is less bad than a gruesome mid-term D&E abortion.
Do you think that the invention and widespread usage of artificial wombs would change most peoples' opinions on abortion? Would it change yours?
I want blacks to go away, abortion is way more human than a genocidal race war.