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Philip's avatar

I think there's a difference between intuition and priors. In the example of your Mom, her belief in physiognomy was posterior, in that it was based on her evidence. The reason she couldn't defeat your argument was that her evidence was her many (face, character) observations, which she wasn't able to recall and cite to you. I think the paradigm "intuition" is the feeling that somebody is watching/following you. But again, this doesn't seem to fit the notion of a "prior" belief.

The way I think about it, "inuitions" are "propositions you affirm without having a reason." This accommodates things like the two abovementioned cases, which seem to represent subconscious (?) pattern recognition from a large set of sense data. This definition also accommodates a priori "seemings," like the facts that "nothing can be both completely green and completely red", and "causing pain for no reason is bad."

One problem with this definition is there are lots of propositions I affirm, without knowing how I know them (because I've forgotten how I came to know them). For example, the speed of light is 3x10^8 m/s, or the capital of Spain is Madrid. So it appears that I affirm them without a reason; but they don't seem like intuitions. I think the difference is that in these cases, despite not knowing what the justifying reason is, I know that there is a justifying reason, I've just forgotten what it is. So maybe we can refine the definition to: "intuitions are propositions you affirm without knowing, or knowing you previously have known, a reason."

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Bentham's Bulldog's avatar

I agree, but you’re not contradicting what I say in the article. Sometimes you shouldn’t buy an argument if it conflicts with intuitions, but other times you should. Non philosophers aren’t moved enough by mere argument.

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