I think there's a difference between intuition and priors. In the example of your Mom, her belief in physiognomy was posterior, in that it was based on her evidence. The reason she couldn't defeat your argument was that her evidence was her many (face, character) observations, which she wasn't able to recall and cite to you. I think the paradigm "intuition" is the feeling that somebody is watching/following you. But again, this doesn't seem to fit the notion of a "prior" belief.
The way I think about it, "inuitions" are "propositions you affirm without having a reason." This accommodates things like the two abovementioned cases, which seem to represent subconscious (?) pattern recognition from a large set of sense data. This definition also accommodates a priori "seemings," like the facts that "nothing can be both completely green and completely red", and "causing pain for no reason is bad."
One problem with this definition is there are lots of propositions I affirm, without knowing how I know them (because I've forgotten how I came to know them). For example, the speed of light is 3x10^8 m/s, or the capital of Spain is Madrid. So it appears that I affirm them without a reason; but they don't seem like intuitions. I think the difference is that in these cases, despite not knowing what the justifying reason is, I know that there is a justifying reason, I've just forgotten what it is. So maybe we can refine the definition to: "intuitions are propositions you affirm without knowing, or knowing you previously have known, a reason."
I agree, but you’re not contradicting what I say in the article. Sometimes you shouldn’t buy an argument if it conflicts with intuitions, but other times you should. Non philosophers aren’t moved enough by mere argument.
Perhaps, but philosophers tend to have trained themselves to ignore their intuition, and are rather prone to hubristic over confidence in their arguments. And philosophers are generally in a position to cause much more damage.
Frankly, most of the 20th century's greatest horrors were caused by philosophers with too much confidence in their arguments.
Intuition matters but it’s not the most important thing, that would be truth. The fact we as conservatives can only appeal to intuitions is one of the many reasons we don’t have an effect academy. The West was at its best when we had the academics that were closest to the truth (during the Middle Ages) and now all we have is skepticism, scientism, and “vibes.” We won’t escape modernity without robust anti-modern thoughts
The physiognomy example you gave seems to counteract the point, though. The argument you gave against physiognomy, while written in explicit premise-conclusion form, is still based on intuition: Presumably, part of the reason for accepting P1 is that it's very intuitive. And I think most people would disagree with the explicit statement of physiognomy, even if they implicitly use it to judge people.
On the other hand, you argue that physiognomy is in fact true by citing studies showing correlations between facial features and other traits. This is clearly not an intuitive argument - it's based on empirical evidence. And from the conclusion you draw, you obviously think the empirical argument is stronger than the purely rational/intuition-based argument that had convinced you before you looked at the empirical evidence. So your conclusion regarding physiognomy is not based on strong priors - your prior belief was that it's false based on the argument - but on a posteriori evidence.
I think there's a difference between intuition and priors. In the example of your Mom, her belief in physiognomy was posterior, in that it was based on her evidence. The reason she couldn't defeat your argument was that her evidence was her many (face, character) observations, which she wasn't able to recall and cite to you. I think the paradigm "intuition" is the feeling that somebody is watching/following you. But again, this doesn't seem to fit the notion of a "prior" belief.
The way I think about it, "inuitions" are "propositions you affirm without having a reason." This accommodates things like the two abovementioned cases, which seem to represent subconscious (?) pattern recognition from a large set of sense data. This definition also accommodates a priori "seemings," like the facts that "nothing can be both completely green and completely red", and "causing pain for no reason is bad."
One problem with this definition is there are lots of propositions I affirm, without knowing how I know them (because I've forgotten how I came to know them). For example, the speed of light is 3x10^8 m/s, or the capital of Spain is Madrid. So it appears that I affirm them without a reason; but they don't seem like intuitions. I think the difference is that in these cases, despite not knowing what the justifying reason is, I know that there is a justifying reason, I've just forgotten what it is. So maybe we can refine the definition to: "intuitions are propositions you affirm without knowing, or knowing you previously have known, a reason."
I agree, but you’re not contradicting what I say in the article. Sometimes you shouldn’t buy an argument if it conflicts with intuitions, but other times you should. Non philosophers aren’t moved enough by mere argument.
Perhaps, but philosophers tend to have trained themselves to ignore their intuition, and are rather prone to hubristic over confidence in their arguments. And philosophers are generally in a position to cause much more damage.
Frankly, most of the 20th century's greatest horrors were caused by philosophers with too much confidence in their arguments.
https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/06/06/asymmetric-weapons-gone-bad/
And those were legitimately smart philosophers. Most people who fancy themselves philosophers aren't even particularly smart.
I don’t believe that philosophers were the problem in the 20th century.
Intuition matters but it’s not the most important thing, that would be truth. The fact we as conservatives can only appeal to intuitions is one of the many reasons we don’t have an effect academy. The West was at its best when we had the academics that were closest to the truth (during the Middle Ages) and now all we have is skepticism, scientism, and “vibes.” We won’t escape modernity without robust anti-modern thoughts
BB literally believes that center left vibes from his social circle are “just correct”.
The arguments are the rationalization for his vibes.
The physiognomy example you gave seems to counteract the point, though. The argument you gave against physiognomy, while written in explicit premise-conclusion form, is still based on intuition: Presumably, part of the reason for accepting P1 is that it's very intuitive. And I think most people would disagree with the explicit statement of physiognomy, even if they implicitly use it to judge people.
On the other hand, you argue that physiognomy is in fact true by citing studies showing correlations between facial features and other traits. This is clearly not an intuitive argument - it's based on empirical evidence. And from the conclusion you draw, you obviously think the empirical argument is stronger than the purely rational/intuition-based argument that had convinced you before you looked at the empirical evidence. So your conclusion regarding physiognomy is not based on strong priors - your prior belief was that it's false based on the argument - but on a posteriori evidence.