One could argue that human infants, like human embryos and human fetuses, are not persons but only *potential* persons. They don't have the current ability to visualize or conceive of their life as a whole, after all.
I think a lot of people would say the reverse, that it's worse to murder a baby than an adult. Kind of a moot question cause uhh they're both pretty unacceptable? Or so one would hope!
"A person is a conscious being who has or will develop the ability to conceive of their life as a whole."
How does this not begin with conception or perhaps implantation? A successfully implanted embryo, assuming it's a normal pregnancy and not ectopic or anything like that, is obviously on a course to develop consciousness, if allowed to grow and not terminated pre-emptively.
2. Is on course to develop the ability to conceive of their life as a whole.
Being on a course to develop consciousness doesn't count. If it did, then a single sperm cell would be a person. Also, if a man ate a delicious steak and potato dinner and his body turned some of it into sperm, the steak and potato dinner would be a person.
>Is on course to develop the ability to conceive of their life as a whole.
Being on a course to develop consciousness doesn't count.<
This seems like a purely semantic difference. The implanted embryo is also clearly on a course to "develop the ability to conceive of their life as a whole."
>If it did, then a single sperm cell would be a person.<
No, sperm cells obviously are not on a course in this same way. Only an embryo is on a course to develop a consciousness. A sperm cell alone cannot grow into a person any more than a rock or a blade of grass can.
Yes, this! Especially after the point of pregnancy where twinning is no longer possible. If potential is relevant, then this should apply not just to human infants, but also to human embryos and human fetuses that are at least no longer capable of twinning. If potential is irrelevant, then not even human infants should be considered persons, which might indicate that the law should be changed so that killing a wanted human infant should have the same penalty as killing a wanted non-human animal of comparable intelligence.
That's the thing, though: Human infants, to my knowledge, have no ability to visualize or conceive their life as a whole. They have no deep concept of the future, certainly not beyond a moment ahead of time, anyway. Why should they be considered persons, then? Indeed, why should Peter Singer's and Michael Tooley's arguments about *excluding* human infants from personhood *not* be considered valid, if my premises above here are indeed correct?
Why does a developmental path for this matter and not a developmental path for consciousness? Why shouldn’t one argue that one should have this ability right now instead?
And Yes, I know that both Singer and Tooley are pro-choice. Singer also supports elective infanticide of severely disabled infants, and Tooley appears to support either that or perhaps even elective infanticide more broadly.
Are terminally ill babies not persons?
One could argue that human infants, like human embryos and human fetuses, are not persons but only *potential* persons. They don't have the current ability to visualize or conceive of their life as a whole, after all.
I think a lot of people would say the reverse, that it's worse to murder a baby than an adult. Kind of a moot question cause uhh they're both pretty unacceptable? Or so one would hope!
"is on course to develop the ability to conceptualize its life as a whole, even if that development will be cut short by some accident or illness."
Wouldn't that include embryos and fetuses as well, then?
An embryo is not conscious, so it does not meet point 1 of the definition.
An embryo is on a developmental path to become conscious, though.
"A person is a conscious being who has or will develop the ability to conceive of their life as a whole."
How does this not begin with conception or perhaps implantation? A successfully implanted embryo, assuming it's a normal pregnancy and not ectopic or anything like that, is obviously on a course to develop consciousness, if allowed to grow and not terminated pre-emptively.
The 2 criteria are:
1. Must currently be conscious
2. Is on course to develop the ability to conceive of their life as a whole.
Being on a course to develop consciousness doesn't count. If it did, then a single sperm cell would be a person. Also, if a man ate a delicious steak and potato dinner and his body turned some of it into sperm, the steak and potato dinner would be a person.
>Is on course to develop the ability to conceive of their life as a whole.
Being on a course to develop consciousness doesn't count.<
This seems like a purely semantic difference. The implanted embryo is also clearly on a course to "develop the ability to conceive of their life as a whole."
>If it did, then a single sperm cell would be a person.<
No, sperm cells obviously are not on a course in this same way. Only an embryo is on a course to develop a consciousness. A sperm cell alone cannot grow into a person any more than a rock or a blade of grass can.
Yes, this! Especially after the point of pregnancy where twinning is no longer possible. If potential is relevant, then this should apply not just to human infants, but also to human embryos and human fetuses that are at least no longer capable of twinning. If potential is irrelevant, then not even human infants should be considered persons, which might indicate that the law should be changed so that killing a wanted human infant should have the same penalty as killing a wanted non-human animal of comparable intelligence.
That's the thing, though: Human infants, to my knowledge, have no ability to visualize or conceive their life as a whole. They have no deep concept of the future, certainly not beyond a moment ahead of time, anyway. Why should they be considered persons, then? Indeed, why should Peter Singer's and Michael Tooley's arguments about *excluding* human infants from personhood *not* be considered valid, if my premises above here are indeed correct?
Human infants are on a developmental path to have the ability to conceptualize their life as a whole.
Also, Singer and Tooley go further and use their arguments about infant personhood to support abortion, which I don't support.
Why does a developmental path for this matter and not a developmental path for consciousness? Why shouldn’t one argue that one should have this ability right now instead?
And Yes, I know that both Singer and Tooley are pro-choice. Singer also supports elective infanticide of severely disabled infants, and Tooley appears to support either that or perhaps even elective infanticide more broadly.